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Delaware's Appraisal Statute: The Courts' Artificial
Ceiling on Asset Valuation Weighting
Prices have increased dramatically during the past decade. This
is particularly true for natural resource prices. Companies owning
such resources have seen these assets become an increasingly signifi-
cant indicia of their intrinsic worth.' Consequently, the general busi-
ness community views natural resource corporations differently than
it views other types of corporations.2 Businesses .will frequently make
an investment, acquisition, or merger decision by valuing such a cor-
poration's assets with little or no regard to the corporation's other
attributes. 3
Although the Delaware courts4 have recognized the importance
of asset holdings in natural resource corporations,' they have only re-
luctantly emphasized asset value when valuing dissenting sharehold-
ers' stock under Delaware's appraisal statute.5 This reluctance stems
from a judicially-imposed limitation on the amount of weight which
may be given to a corporation's assets when valuing the stock.6 Until
recently, this limitation posed no problem since asset value rarely
comprised the bulk of a corporation's total value. The tremendous
rise in natural resource prices, however, has recently made the limita-
tion a barrier to a more realistic appraisal.
This note analyzes the courts' limitation on asset weighting.
Part I discusses Delaware's appraisal statute and the system of valua-
tion developed by Delaware courts; Part II examines weighting of the
asset valuation; and Part III suggests a more practical approach to
valuing natural resource corporations.
1 See Part III A. infia.
2 See notes 85-86 infia and accompanying text.
3 See notes 87-89 infa and accompanying text.
4 The Delaware appraisal approach has been chosen for its position as a model for other
states, the large number of national corporations incorporated in Delaware, the many deci-
sions in that jurisdiction which deal with the appraisal statute, and the relatively standard-
ized approach the Delaware courts have for valuing a corporation. See Comment, Short-Formn
Merger in Missouri Potential Problems for Minony Shareholders, 46 Mo. L. REv. 195, 196 (1981).
See also Banks, Measuning the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 26, 34 (1974). Thus,
while discussion here specifically addresses Delaware's appraisal schemes, Delaware's perva-
sive influence in the area of corporate law makes the discussion applicable to all jurisdictions
with a similar appraisal statute.
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262 (1974 & Supp. 1980). See notes 69-71 infra and accompa-
nying text.
6 See Part II infia.
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I. The Delaware Appraisal Statute
A. Erosion of Minoripy Shareholder Veto Rights
Under general common law a corporation could not make a fun-
damental change without unanimous shareholder approval. 7 Thus a
dissenting shareholder8 owning a single share could essentially veto
the corporation's sale or merger. As the demands and complexities of
modern business increased, this veto power debilitated corporate
management.9 Legislatures responded by enacting merger statutes
that denied dissenting minority shareholders this common law
power. 0
Although these statutory provisions satisfied the corporation's
desire to effect a merger without unanimous consent, they left the
shareholder with a difficult decision. Deprived of his veto power, a
dissenting shareholder had to either become a shareholder in the new
corporation or sell his stock.1 Neither choice was necessarily palat-
able to the shareholder. If he became a shareholder in the new cor-
poration he was investing in an entity which refused to follow his
preferred policies. If he sold his stock he had to accept either the
market price or any price the corporation offered. In many cases, an
active market did not exist or the market price did not reflect the
stock's true value. 12
Delaware and other states have adopted appraisal statutes in re-
sponse to this inequity.1 3 These statutes authorize a dissenting mi-
nority shareholder to request an appraisal of his stock. Under the
Delaware statute, the court determines the stock's "fair value" and
directs the surviving or resulting corporation to pay this value to the
dissenting shareholders. 14 Unfortunately, the statute fails to explain
how to determine a share's "fair value" other than to say that it does
7 See Note, Valuation ofDissenters Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453
(1966).
8 As used in this note, a dissenting shareholder is one who objects to a corporate merger
or consolidation "and has not voted in favor of or consented to the merger or consolidation."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(b) (Supp. 1980).
9 See Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholders Right
of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1976).
10 Id. at 1028.
11 See Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining "Fair Value" Under the Delaware
Appraisal Statute, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 426, 427 (1981).
12 See notes 52-54 infa and accompanying text.
13 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262 (1974 & Supp. 1980). All states enable dissenting
minority shareholders to demand the appraised value of their stock. See Note, supra note 7, at
1453.
14 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(0, (g) (Supp. 1980).
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not include any value associated with the merger.15 Thus, the judici-
ary developed valuation methods to satisfy the statute's purpose.
B. Valuation Methods.: The Judiciag's Flexible Approach
When a merger or consolidation occurs, a dissenting shareholder
often decides to relinquish his stock in the corporation. 16 In the early
case of Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 17 a Delaware court explained that the
appraisal remedy existed in order to give the minority shareholder
"what he has been deprived of," the value of a shareholder's stock.' 8
To determine the "intrinsic value" of that stock,' 9 Delaware courts
have adopted a relatively flexible valuation method. Based on the
premises that all corporations are unique and that every relevant fac-
tor should be considered, 20 a court will normally determine three sep-
arate valuations-a market valuation, an investment valuation, and
an asset valuation.2 1
Market valuation is determined by calculating the price at
which a willing seller would transfer a share of stock to a willing
buyer.2 2 If the stock is actively traded, this calculation is relatively
simple. The applicable quotation for that stock will provide the nec-
essary information. If the stock is not actively traded, however, the
calculation becomes more complicated. The court must attempt to
find a "hypothetical market value" for such stock.23 In determining
this value, the court will normally look to similar companies that
have an active market for their stock.2 4 It may also refer to the cor-
15 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262() (Supp. 1980).
16 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
17 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934).
18 See id at 150, 172 A. at 455.
19 The term "intrinsic value" is repeatedly referred to by the courts as the amount that a
dissenting shareholder should receive from the appraisal. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del.
Ch. 406,415, 213 A.2d 203, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch.
523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
20 See 31 Del. Ch. at 526, 74 A.2d at 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See generally Note, The Dissenting
Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 629 (1977) (concluding that each case must
be viewed in context of its own unique facts).
21 See Note, supra note 7, at 1457. Dividend value occasionally has been calculated, but
most cases rely exclusively on the investment, market, and asset valuations, apparently feeling
dividend considerations are adequately reflected in those calculations. But see In re Delaware
Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (dividend value weighted at
10%); Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Oh. 593, 98 A.2d 774 (Ch. 1953) (dividend value
weighted at 25%).
22 See Note, supra note 7, at 1463.
23 Id
24 Id
[December 1982]
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poration's earnings prospects. Finally, the court will arrive at an ap-
propriate figure-the price at which a hypothetical seller would
transfer a share of stock to a hypothetical buyer.25
Investment valuation is determined by a two-step process: 1)
calculation of the corporation's annual earnings; and 2) selection of a
multiplier. 26 Courts usually calculate a corporation's annual earn-
ings by taking its average earnings over the past five years. 27 Selec-
tion of a multiplier depends upon the soundness and predictability of
the earnings. 28 The product of the multiplier and the earnings calcu-
lation results in the corporation's investment valuation. 29
Asset valuation is determined by calculating the corporation's
theoretical liquidation value. The corporation is viewed as if it were
being dissolved and its assets distributed to its shareholders or sold to
third parties. The assets' hypothetical liquidation values are totalled
to reach the asset valuation figure.30
After calculating these valuations, the court assigns a specific
weight to each.3' Delaware courts use two significant factors in de-
termining the weight given to each particular valuation: the type of
company being appraised and the reliability of the valuation.3 2 In
considering the first factor, Delaware courts apply different degrees
of weight to a particular valuation depending on its relative impor-
25 Id
26 Id at 1464.
27 Id
28 Id at 1464, 1467.
29 Id For example, if a stock had per share average earnings of $2.00 and a selected
multiplier of 10, the earnings times the multiplier would result in an investment valuation of
$20.00.
30 Prior to the decision in Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. 1968),
there was confusion among the Delaware courts whether the asset valuation should be calcu-
lated on a liquidation or potential earnings basis. The court in Poole rejected the potential
earnings approach for asset valuation and held that the asset valuation is to be determined by
the fair market value of the corporation. Id at 72. The court thus rejected earnings consider-
ations for asset valuation, stating, "[a]ny allowance for earning power of the assets or value of
the business, deemed necessary under the circumstances of a given case, is best left to the
court's consideration of earnings as an independent element of stock value and to the court's
exercise of its weighting function." Id See Comment, supra note 11, at 429 n.26.
31 For example, in Lebman v. National Union Electric, 414 A.2d 824 (Del. Ch. 1980), an
electronics manufacturing firm was assigned a market value weight of 40%, an investment
value weight of 35%, and an asset value weight of 25%. Id at 828. In Lebman, the weights
were typical for a manufacturing firm's valuation. Such a company normally relies much
more heavily on earnings than on liquidation value for intrinsic worth. Consequently, the
investment and market valuations, which largely depend upon the company's earnings for
their calculation, received more weight than the asset valuation. Id See notes 65-66 infra and
accompanying text.
32 See Note, supra note 7, at 1468-71; Note, supra note 20, at 640-43.
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tance to the corporation's intrinsic value.33 The second factor reflects
the court's confidence in a particular valuation. A valuation relying
on conjecture and unpredictable estimates normally receives less
weight. Conversely, a particularly reliable valuation based on fairly
predictable events normally receives more weight.3 4
Weighting the three separate valuations ensures that no single
valuation is exclusively determinative, thus minimizing the inherent
defects in calculating those figures. 35 Weighting also allows the court
to emphasize a specific valuation if that valuation is more indicative
of the corporation's true worth. 36 Finally, weighting provides the
court with a flexible method to mold its valuation around the corpo-
ration's particular attributes.37
Generally, the Delaware valuation process provides a workable
solution to the problem of valuing a dissenting shareholder's stock.38
It uses empirical facts to formulate reasonable values from different
viewpoints and provides the flexibility necessary to emphasize those
facts as each case warrants.
C. Recent Refinements
While the Delaware courts' valuation method is laudable, there
remain at least two drawbacks to the appraisal remedy itself. First,
33 See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975)
(motion picture studio depended heavily on earnings, not assets for its value); In re Olivetti
Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968) (investment and market value received most
weight for typewriter manufacturer); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del.
Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Ch. 1950) (market value emphasized because corporation had an active
market for its stock); In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch.
1947) (assets weighted more heavily because the corporation depended more on value of real
estate and securities than on good management).
34 See, e.g., Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (Ch.
1956) (market value disregarded because it was artificially sustained); Heller v. Munsing-
wear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774 (Ch. 1953) (asset valuation deemphasized because
that value was so dissimilar to other values).
35 Note, supra note 20, at 640 (1977).
36 Id at 640-43.
37 Id See also Note, supra note 7, at 1468-71. Confronted with a highly leveraged corpo-
ration, for example, the court may wish to minimize extremely high earnings. It could ac-
complish this by decreasing the weight given to the earnings valuation. Similarly, the court
could increase the asset valuation's weight when confronted with a corporation relying exten-
sively on its assets, such as a natural resource company. See Part III injfa.
38 For other suggested appraisal methods, see generaly Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974) (appraisal should in-
clude value of gains generated by merger); Birk, Shareholder's Appraisal Process: Needfor Reform,
51 N.Y. ST. BJ. 274 (1979) (appraisal should be analogous to eminent domain proceedings);
Note, The Valuation of a Close Corporation:L Glimpses of Objectivity in an Inflationag Period 13 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 107 (1981) (valuation should be based on book value as adjusted for inflation).
[December 1982]
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the shareholder is virtually forced to sell his stock,39 and second, cer-
tain shareholders are not protected by the appraisal statute.4 °
When a shareholder sells his stock, he often incurs a tax liabil-
ity.4 ' This liability would not exist or at least could be deferred if the
dissenting shareholder was not forced to sell his stock. Thus, after
adjustment for tax liabilities, the appraisal remedy normally gives
the shareholder less value than the stock had to him before its sale.42
Such a result fails to accomplish the appraisal statute's purpose of
giving the dissenting shareholder "what he is deprived of."
The Delaware courts have lessened, although not eliminated,
the negative effect of the appraisal statute's forced sale feature by
allowing a minority shareholder to block a merger under certain cir-
cumstances. In a line of cases beginning with Singer v. Magnavox Co. 
4 3
the courts have held that the transaction must meet the standard of
"entire fairness." 44 If the sole reason for effecting a merger is to
"freeze-out" 45 minority shareholders, the court will disallow the
merger.46 The courts require that the transaction be entirely fair and
that the merger have a legitimate business purpose.4 7 Thus, if a dis-
senting shareholder can establish that a merger is not entirely fair, he
will also avoid the forced sale aspect of the appraisal statute.
The appraisal statute's second disadvantage is that it fails to af-
ford the appraisal right to shareholders whose stock was "either (1)
listed on a national securities exchange or (2) held of record by more
than 2000 stockholders. '48 Proponents of this "stock market excep-
tion" claim that a minority shareholder purchases stock in a widely-
held corporation with a mind only toward profits from a future
sale.49 They argue that such a shareholder has no interest in the na-
ture of the business and that the market pribe is the value the ap-
praisal procedure is supposed to find anyway.
50
39 See text accompanying note 11-14 supra.
40 See note 48 injfa and accompanying text.
41 A shareholder's tax liability is determined by the gain, if any, he recognizes upon the
sale or disposition of his stock. See I.R.C. §10.31 (1976).
42 See Comment, Shareholder4 Rights in Shal-Form Mergers: The New Delaware Formula, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 687, 699 (1981).
43 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
44 Id at 976.
45 A "freeze-out" refers to any transaction designed to eliminate minority interests in a
corporation. See Comment, supra note 11 at 427 n. 15.
46 380 A.2d 969, 980.
47 Id at 975.
48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(k) (Supp. 1980).
49 See Note, supra note 9, at 1029.
50 Id at 1030.
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Commentators severely criticize these arguments.5" A stock's
price frequently reflects factors other than the corporation's intrinsic
value. A general market upturn may carry the stock with it although
the reason for the upturn may affect the corporation less than the
price rise indicates. 52 Tax selling may occasionally depress a stock's
value.53 Finally, a majority shareholder can often manipulate even a
large corporation's stock price.54 Delaware courts have recognized
the unreliability of a stock's market price. Notwithstanding the ap-
praisal statute's edict, they often have valued a corporation's stock in
the traditional weighting manner even though an active market for
the stock has existed.55
Both the courts' refusal to strictly follow the stock market excep-
tion and the dissenting shareholders' ability to invoke the entire fair-
ness theory when objecting to a merger have greatly reduced the
drawbacks associated with the appraisal remedy. A shareholder may
insist that the merger be "fair" to minority shareholders. If unsatis-
fied with a "fair" merger, the shareholder may ask for an appraisal.
This appraisal, if the court takes full advantage of the innovative
method of weighting the three valuations, can provide a realistic ap-
proximation of the stock's intrinsic value.
II. Asset Valuation Weighting
Delaware courts have devised a commendable method of valu-
ing a dissenting shareholder's stock.56 The method's strongest attri-
bute is the flexibility it provides by weighting a particular valuation
in a manner reflective of the corporation's specific circumstances.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to fully use this flexibility when
weighting a corporation's asset valuation.
5 7
51 See Brudney and Chirelstein, supra note 38, at 306; Comment, supra note 42, at 700-01.
See generaly Brudney, Eftient Markets and Fair Mergers in Parent Subsidiar, Mergers 4 J. CORP. L.
63 (1978); Note, supra note 9.
52 See Schilt, Pitfalls in the Valuation of Closely Held Companies, TR. & EST., June 1980, at 44.
53 Tax selling refers to the investment practice of selling stocks toward the end of the year
in order to minimize taxes by recognizing capital losses in the stocks that have declined in
price. This concentrated selling often depresses a stock's price for a short period. See generally
Y. HIRSCH, THE 1980 STOCK TRADER'S ALMANAC 109 (1979) (referring to relatively lower
prices in December of each year as tax selling occurs).
54 See Note, supra note 9, at 1052-54.
55 Id at 1054-60. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(market price given only a 55% weighting); Greene v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30
(Del. Oh. 1971) (other factors could, in certain circumstances, be considered).
56 See notes 19-38 supra and accompanying text.
57 Most decisions center their weighting discussion on the amount of emphasis to be
given to the company's asset valuation. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137
[December 1982]
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This reluctance apparently stems from a misinterpretation of
the Delaware courts' "going concern" appraisal standard. This stan-
dard causes the courts to view the corporation as an on-going rather
than dissolving business.5 8 The court in Tn-Continental Corp. v. Bat-
pe 59 said this standard meant that the courts must consider "all fac-
tors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of
value," including market value, earnings value, and asset value.60
This statement conforms to the rationale behind the traditional valu-
ation method.61 Another of the court's statements, however, appar-
ently generated the judiciary's subsequent reluctance to
appropriately emphasize asset valuation. The court said that "since
value is to be fixed on a going-concern basis, the liquidating value of
the stock may not be accepted as the sole measure. '62 Courts in sub-
sequent cases have interpreted this as an edict to deemphasize the
asset valuation factor, rather than simply a direction to consider fac-
tors in addition to asset value. Later cases, therefore, began minimiz-
ing asset valuation, consistently citing Tri-Continental as support.
63
While minimizing the importance of asset valuation, Delaware
courts have been willing to give it significant, yet arguably insuffi-
cient, 64 weight when valuing a real estate, investment, or natural re-
source company. The Delaware courts have correctly recognized
that such corporations are different from their manufacturing coun-
terparts. A manufacturing company relies very little on the value of
its assets, such as plants and factories, to carry on its business.
Rather, these assets have value to the corporation only to the extent
that they produce goods that generate earnings. 65 Consequently,
earnings are the most important valuation component to a manufac-
(Del. 1980); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (Ch. 1965); Sporborg v. City
Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (Ch. 1956); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Min-
neapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Ch. 1950); In re General Realty & Utils.
Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch. 1947).
58 See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
59 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
60 Id at 526, 74 A.2d at 72.
61 See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
62 31 Del. Ch. at 526, 74 A.2d at 72.
63 See, e.g., In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
(assets weighted at 25%); Levin v. Midland Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (Ch.
1963) (assets weighted at 50%); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123
A.2d 121 (Ch. 1956) (assets weighted at 40%); Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593,
98 A.2d 774 (Ch. 1953) (assets weighted at 20%).
64 See Part III infra.
65 See Comment, supra note 11, at 433.
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turing enterprise and courts will tend to give very little weight to the
value of such a firm's assets. 66 Investment and natural resource com-
panies, on the other hand, depend primarily on their assets to gener-
ate direct earnings, either from return on investment or from
appreciation and sale of the assets themselves. 67 Delaware courts
have accordingly weighted such companies' asset valuations more
heavily.68
Although the courts admit the primacy of asset value in some
companies, particularly natural resource companies, their decisions
have shown a reluctance to weight assets above 50%, even in cases
where the court indicates that assets comprise most of the corpora-
tion's value.69 The court in Swanton v. State Guaranty Co. 70 considered
this 50% limit and concluded that the limit had little, if any, basis.
Disregarding the 50% ceiling, the Swanton court assigned a 60%
weight to a real estate corporation's asset valuation. 71 Subsequent
66 See Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975) (manufacturing
plant assets given 0% weighting since they had value only to the extent they produced
income).
67 The court in Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (Ch. 1965),
stated:
The capital appreciation investment policy of Guaranty, presumably motivated in
part by tax considerations, suggests that placing undue weight in this appraisal
proceeding on the normally important earnings factor would give a false picture of
the intrinsic value of Guaranty's stock. . . . Also, to the extent the "market" appar-
ently valued this stock on the basis of earnings and dividends it clear'y did not givejfull
recognition to its going concern value.
Id at 482, 215 A.2d at 245 (emphasis added).
68 See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (timber products com-
pany's assets given 40% weight); Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d
242 (Ch. 1965) (inVestment and real estate company's asset valuation given 60% weight); In re
General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch. 1947) (real estate holding
company's asset valuation given 50% weight). See generaly Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,
402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979) (petroleum company's assets given 40% weight).
69 The court in Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (Ch. 1963),
reduced an admittedly important asset valuation weight from 60% to 50%. Conforming to
the judiciary's 50% ceiling, the court stated:
[T]he principal factor in the value of the stock was undoubtedly the exceptionally
strong asset position of the corporation. I conclude therefore that the appraiser's
high weighting of asset value was basically correct. It will, however, principally be-
cause of Delaware precedents on this subject be reduced from 60% to 50%.
Id at 289, 194 A.2d at 58 (emphasis added).
70 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (Ch. 1965).
71 The court in Swanton seemed to dismiss the logic of the 50% ceiling by stating:
Defendants emphasize that no reported Delaware case has weighted asset value at
more than 50%. Like Professor Dewing's capitalization chart, such a fact is not the
"be-all and end-all" here. The court's apparent deference to the 50% figure in Levin v.
Midland-Ross Corp.,-Del CA-, 194 A.2d 50, is not and indeed, considenng the subject
matter, could not be considered a rule of law.
[December 1982]
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cases have not taken Swanton's lead, however, and continue to adhere
to an apparent 50% ceiling for asset valuation. 72
This limitation has little foundation. Theoretically, a corpora-
tion's appraisal should reflect its intrinsic value.73 When a com-
pany's assets comprise most of this value, the weighting should
emphasize assets to the proper extent. The courts have advanced no
jurisprudential reason justifying adherence to a 50% ceiling. The Ti-
Continental court emphasized that all elements should be considered
when appraising a corporation.74 It did not say that the asset valua-
tion is unimportant, merely that it is not to be the only factor consid-
ered.75 The Tri-Continental approach is totally consistent with the
rationale behind the valuation method. None of the three factors
should be solely determinative of a company's value.76 The Dela-
ware valuation method provides an inherent flexibility which ensures
that the final valuation will be a composite of all the factors, with
each factor weighted according to its importance to the corporation's
intrinsic value.77 The courts apparently have no prohibition against
weighting the other valuations above 50%. Investment value has
been weighted as high as 87.5%.78 The Delaware judiciary should
therefore find little difficulty giving the appropriate weight to asset
value, even if it does exceed 50%.
Thus, if an appraisal clearly shows that the asset value comprises
the bulk of a corporation's intrinsic worth, no apparent reason exists
Id at 484, 215 A.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
72 The only case since Swanton to exceed the 50% ceiling was In re Creole Petroleum
Corp., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 606 (Del. Ch. 1978). The court in Creole held that a 100% asset
value weighting was appropriate, distinguishing that case from other appraisal cases because
Creole's assets were to be nationalized. Thus, the court did not treat Creole as a typical
appraisal situation. The corporation was, in essence, valued on a liquidating, not going-con-
cern, basis. The court also tempered the precedential impact of its move above the 50%
ceiling by admitting that in other Delaware cases "a maximum weight of 50 percent is pre-
ferred." Id at 614. While Creole apparently authorizes a higher asset value weighting only
upon imminent liquidation, the case still has value to future courts as an example of the 50%
ceiling being exceeded.
73 See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
74 See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
75 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
76 A possible exception exists where the company being appraised faces imminent liqui-
dation. See In re Creole Petroleum Corp., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 606 (Del. Ch. 1978) and note 72
swpra.
77 See notes 19-21, 31-38 supra and accompanying text.
78 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975).
Market valuation also has no apparent 50% ceiling as indicated by the appraisal statute's
adoption of the stock market exception, see notes 48-55 sura and accompanying text, and the
55% weight given market valuation in Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch.
1975).
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for not weighting that value accordingly. 79 The rationale behind the
courts' self-imposed ceiling of 50% remains unexplained.
III. Asset Valuation and Natural Resource Companies
A. Nonrenewable Natural Resource Companies. A Unique Situation
Spiraling inflation throughout the past decade has transformed
the nature of nonrenewable natural resource companies. The tre-
mendous appreciation of their assets' value often has made that fac-
tor the most important element to the corporation's intrinsic value.80
The asset valuation of such a company could conceivably comprise
over 50% of its worth.8 1 Strict adherence to the court's 50% ceiling,
however, would deny this fact from being fully reflected in the corpo-
ration's appraisal.
Nonrenewable natural resource companies differ from other en-
terprises. Their income depends on a continual liquidation of their
assets. These assets, unlike renewable natural resources, do not re-
plenish themselves.8 2 Thus, any distinction between a corporation's
liquidation value and its going-concern value becomes increasingly
insignificant when a court appraises a nonrenewable natural resource
company.8 3
Nonrenewable natural resources normally comprise an over-
whelming percentage of an oil, gas, or coal company's assets. Such
enterprises typically drill, dig, or mine their assets for direct sale to a
refiner or other third party. Thus, the corporation's continued exist-
ence depends almost exclusively on the value of those resources. If
the resources' value decreases, the corporation's value also decreases.
If the resources' value increases, the corporation's value increases.
The stock price movements of major oil companies are representative
79 Certain commentators observe that investment value often receives a higher weighting
because that element traditionally comprises most of a corporation's fair value. Se Note,
supra note 20, at 637. This observation, however, fails to address the situation where a court
finds that most of a company's value derives from its assets.
80 See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979) (asset weighting of 40%
was as high or higher than other two weightings). Certain investment services specifically
calculate a petroleum company's proven oil reserve value, indicating that such a calculation
is often considered an inherent measure of value. See 37 THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT
SURVEY RATINGS & REPORTS 1824 (June 18, 1982).
81 The court actually weighted asset valuation at 100% in In re Creole Petroleum, 3 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 606 (Del. Ch. 1978), although the situation in that case was unique. See note 72
sprfa.
82 See generaly Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (timber was har-
vested in manner that caused continual replenishment of company's timber assets).
83 See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
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of this relationship.8 4
Both renewable and nonrenewable natural resource companies
rely on their assets for intrinsic value when selling either a portion or
all of their holdings to another party. The purchasing party and the
selling corporation look to the value and appreciation potential of
the natural resources when formulating a transaction price.85 This
process shows a unique attribute of natural resource companies: the
corporation's assets are relatively marketable, making asset valuation
realistic. Thus, liquidation value uniquely reflects a natural resource
company's intrinsic value.
86
The recent surge of tender offers for natural resource compa-
nies8 7 also exemplifies that asset value provides a significant indicia
of a natural resource corporation's intrinsic worth. These tender of-
fers consistently include a substantial premium over the stock's origi-
nal market price.88 This premium may reflect synergistic and other
attractions to the acquiring corporation. When a natural resource
company is the object of the tender offer, however, the major consid-
84 During the 1980 "oil crisis," oil companies' stock prices increased dramatically, far
outdistancing any general market increase. During the recent "oil glut," on the other hand,
stock prices of the major oil companies fell greatly in excess of any general market decrease.
These dramatic increases and decreases in stock prices coincided almost exactly with the price
movements in the world oil markets. While the increased stock price undoubtedly reflected
prospects for increased earnings as.well as an increase in the value of the companies' oil assets,
those increased earnings were a direct consequence of oil's appreciation in value; there could
have been no increased earnings if the value of the companies' assets had not increased first.
This strongly suggests that oil companies rely almost exclusively on the value of their oil for
the degree of earnings derived from its sale. See 37 THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
RATINGS & REPORTS 1826 (Sept. 17, 1982) (graph showing stock prices of petroleum compa-
nies diverged from general stock prices during 1980 oil crisis and 1981-82 oil glut).
85 This was explained in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), afd,
413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), where minority shareholders argued that recent sales of lumber
companies indicated that asset value, not earnings value, was the primary consideration in
setting the sales price. The shareholders explained that the prices offered for these companies
represented only a 2% return on investment if calculated solely on an earnings basis. Id at
734. Only when the unrealized appreciation of these assets is considered do the offered prices
seem realistic. See Comment, supra note 11, at 437.
86 This characteristic fails to hold true for the asset valuation of a typical manufacturing
firm where assets are normally unmarketable or must be sold at desperation prices. For ex-
ample, the court in Kirby indicated that a manufacturing company's assets had no independ-
ent liquidation value, but had value only to the extent that they generate earnings "because
essentially this is the only way such a corporation can generate a return on investment." 395
A.2d at 734.
87 In 1979 there were as many as 114 tender offers, many dealing with natural resource
companies. See Note, Tender Offer Developments in 1980, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 999 (1981).
88 For example, in a recent tender for Conoco, Mobil Oil Corporation offered to pay
$120.00 per share for Conoco's stock, which was nearly $70.00 above the $50.00 pre-tender
price. See Du Pont s Vito.y, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1981, at 49; The New Urge to Merge, NEWs-
WEEK, July 27, 1981, at 50; Conoco Under Siege, NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1981.
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eration normally concerns the value of the company's assets and their
potential price appreciation. 89
Finally, the appreciation in raw material prices has radically
transformed companies owning natural resources. In the early
1970's, such a company's intrinsic worth could have been as much
dependent on its management and other business concerns as it was
on the value of its assets; now the tremendous rise in the value of its
natural resources often causes that factor to be the primary determi-
nant of the corporation's valueY0
The foregoing factors demonstrate the uniqueness of natural re-
source corporations. They rely heavily on their asset value for their
intrinsic worth. This is particularly true for nonrenewable natural
resource companies which constantly liquidate their assets. Such
companies provide the clearest example where a court's adherence to
an arbitrary limitation would result in an unrealistic valuation.
B. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.
The leading Delaware Supreme Court case dealing with the nat-
ural resource company issue is Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp..91 In Kirby,
the court adopted the "going concern" standard for natural resource
company appraisals and upheld a 40% asset valuation weighting for
a timber and paper products corporation. 92 Kirby Lumber had vast
timberland holdings which it harvested on a "sustained yield" ba-
sis.9 3 Santa Fe Industries acquired about 95% of Kirby Lumber's
stock and consummated a merger under Delaware's short-form
89 In duPont's tender for Conoco, analysts emphasized the value of Conoco's assets stat-
ing that by buying the stock of such a company, the offeror receives oil assets at bargain
prices, often as low as $4.00 to $6.00 per barrel. See Conoco Under Siege, supra note 88, at 57.
Acquistion-minded companies have quickly realized that a resource-rich corporation such as
Conoco presents a bargain in terms of natural resources-while Conoco's asset value was
estimated at over $140.00 per share, the company's pre-tender stock price was in the mid 50's.
See The New Urge to Merge, supra note 88, at 50-51. The present bargain stock prices and the
general conviction that nonrenewable natural resource prices will continue upward are
clearly the major consideration when making a tender offer for a company such as Conoco.
Id
90 The increased importance of asset value to nonrenewable natural resource corpora-
tions is demonstrated by the past decade's rise in oil prices. Prior to 1973 oil sold on the
general market for about $4.00 per barrel. As recently as 1979 a barrel of oil sold for about
$12.00. Currently, a barrel of oil will command a price of around $30.00. See THE VALUE
LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY RATINGS & REPORTS 1824 (June 18, 1982). Thus, the asset
value, in degree of importance to an oil company's intrinsic value, has increased more than
seven-fold during the past decade.
91 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), afg, 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978).
92 Id at 142, 146.
93 Sustained yield, according to the chancery court, "means that [Kirby] harvests and
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merger statute. Certain minority shareholders rejected Santa Fe's
$150.00 per share offer as inadequate and asked for appraisal under
the Delaware statute. A court-appointed appraiser used the tradi-
tional method of valuing and gave the asset valuation a 40%
weighting.94
The minority shareholders raised two arguments: they objected
both to the use of the traditional appraisal method and to the
amount of weight attributed the asset valuation. The shareholders
first argued that a third party arm's length appraisal method should
replace the traditional going-concern approach for natural resource
companies. 95 The shareholders contended that since such companies
are normally sold with asset value as the determinative element, "en-
tire fairness" required that asset value should control Kirby's ap-
praisal. 96 The court rejected this argument by defending the going-
concern approach.97 The opinion adopted the language of Tri-Conti-
nental Corp. v. Batple in holding the traditional valuation method ade-
quate for natural resource company appraisals.98 Although the
decision has been criticized,99 the court appears to have come th the
right conclusion.
The minority shareholders wanted Kirby's asset value to control
the appraisal. The court could have accomplished this simply by
weighting asset valuation more heavily.'t° There was no need to
adopt a new appraisal method. Kirby's minority shareholders appar-
ently attacked the going-concern standard because they thought it
limited the amount of weight the court would give asset valuation.
Actually, any limitation on weighting asset valuation derives from
the arbitrary 50% ceiling, not the going-concern standard101
processes its trees at approximately the same rate at which its timber base grows, thus main-
taining a constant source of timber reserves." 395 A.2d at 733.
94 The Delaware appraisal statute currently provides that "the Court shall appraise the
shares." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §262(o (Supp. 1980). Prior to a 1976 revision, however, the
appraisal statute provided that "the Court. . .shall appoint an appraiser to determine such
value." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §262(e) (1974). The minority shareholder's request for an
appraisal in Kirby occurred prior to the appraisal statute's 1976 revision. Therefore, a court-
appointed appraiser, rather than the court itself, made the initial appraisal.
95 413 A.2d at 140.
96 Id The minority shareholders argued that Singer's "entire fairness" standard should
be exiended to appraisal proceedings. This contention was discussed extensively by one com-
mentator. See notes 11 1-112 infra and accompanying text.
97 id at 141-42.
98 See Id.
99 See text accompanying notes 110-112 infra.
100 See text accompanying note 120 infa; see also note 37 supra.
101 See Part 11 supra.
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The shareholders also contended that, even under the tradi-
tional appraisal method, asset value constituted an overwhelming de-
gree of Kirby's intrinsic worth 0 2 and should therefore be weighted at
90% rather than at 40% as the appraiser had done.103 Kirby's assets
were so substantial, the shareholders contended, that they constituted
the corporation's true value.10 4 The supreme court agreed that no
rule of thumb is applicable to weighting and that assets should be
weighted more heavily as they become more important to the corpo-
ration. 15 The court admitted that with a natural resource company
such as Kirby, asset valuation should receive substantial weight.'0 6
The supreme court nonetheless refused to weight asset valuation
above 40%. Even though this decision conforms to the judiciary's
50% ceiling for asset valuation, 0 7 the result appears justified. The
court apparently limited the asset valuation because of Kirby Lum-
ber's manufacturing characteristics and timber's status as a renewa-
ble natural resource, not because of the 50% ceiling. While the
corporation may have relied on price appreciation of its timber to a
certain extent, the corporation depended on its manufacturing capa-
bilities for its income. 10  Thus, the court found investment value ex-
tremely important and assigned it a 60% weighting.
The court also considered Kirby's sustained yield harvesting
method to be an important factor. Unlike oil or natural gas, Kirby's
timber was not a wasting asset. Kirby owned the timber to provide a
continuous supply of material for its manufacturing operations, not
as a finite asset to be systematically liquidated. 0 9 Thus, Kirby sub-
stantially resembled a manufacturing company and was valued
accordingly.
The Kirby holding has been criticized by at least one commenta-
tor. 1 0 The author argued that Singer's entire fairness standard
102 See 413 A.2d at 142.
103 See id at 141.
104 This contention and the discussion concerning Kirby's vast timberland holdings are
most clearly presented in the lower court's opinion. See 395 A.2d at 733.
105 See 413 A.2d at 143, 146.
106 Id at 146.
107 See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
108 The chancery court said, "while Kirby's lands and forests continue to appreciate in
value here, the distinction is that such assets were not acquired and held solely to appreciate
in value, but rather to provide the materials for its manufacturing operations from which
substantial earnings are being realized." 395 A.2d at 740.
109 The supreme court emphasized Kirby's sustained yield policy saying, "Kirby's re-
sources are essential to the manufacturing operations on a sustained basis from which earn-
ings are generated and dividends paid." 413 A.2d at 145.
110 See Comment, supra note 11.
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should be extended to appraisal proceedings. I I This standard would
require a court to value a natural resource company essentially as if
the transaction were an acquisition of assets."12
Such changes, however, are unnecessary. The traditional valua-
tion method is adequate for valuing natural resource companies.113
The court, while not specifically citing Singer, held that the rule for
valuation was one of "entire fairness."" 4 Using this standard, Kirby's
facts did not warrant a higher asset valuation. Reviewing Kirby's
manufacturing characteristics, the court held that a 40% weighting of
the asset valuation was appropriate-a justifiable conclusion.' 5
C. Natural Resource Companies: A Practical Approach to Valuation
While the Kirby court valued Kirby Lumber primarily as a man-
ufacturing corporation and failed to address the issue of nonrenew-
able natural resources, the holding was nevertheless significant. First,
the court recognized that asset valuation is entitled to substantial
weight in certain circumstances and implied that natural resource
companies are peculiarly suited to such increased weighting."16 Sec-
ond, it stated that the standard for weighting is "one of entire fairness
and sound reasoning in the application of [the] traditional standard
and settled Delaware law to the particular facts of each case."" 17
These judicial observations serve as stepping stones to a more
equitable valuation of natural resource companies. The Delaware
courts have firmly embraced their traditional approach to valuation.
This approach, when used to its full potential, provides an accurate
and flexible method of appraisal .18 By agreeing that natural re-
111 Id at 434-37.
112 Id at 438.
113 See text accompanying notes 16-38 supra.
114 413 A.2d at 143.
115 Although the Kirby court appeared satisfied with the appraiser's valuation and said it
did not constitute reversible error, by stating that it only "fairly capture[d] the situation," the
court seemed to indicate that under the new appraisal procedure, with the court as the initial
appraisal forum, see note 94 supra, a greater weighting may have resulted. 413 A.2d at 146.
See also id. at 150-51 (Quillen, J., concurring).
116 The Kirby court stated:
Kirby's assets at the time of the merger were appreciating in value, appeared to be
saleable on the open market although no sale or liquidation was contemplated, and
the forest utilization on a sustained-yield basis was readily available to generate an
anticipated increase in earnings. Therefore, as in Swanton, asset value is entitled to
substantial weight.
Id at 146.
117 Id at 143.
118 See text accompanying notes 16-38 supra.
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source companies are unique and that their assets should be weighted
more heavily, the courts have the opportunity to ensure that the val-
uation of natural resource companies meets the standard of "entire
fairness and sound reasoning."
The courts, however, must abandon their self-imposed asset
weighting limitation of 50% to ensure this fair valuation. The 50%
ceiling is particularly illogical in view of the concurring opinion in
Kirby *119 Justice Quillen invited the courts to be less restrictive in
weighting asset valuation. Emphasizing the flexibility implicit in the
traditional standard, he stated that in Kirby, "if asset value had been
given even greater weight, the ultimate valuation would have been
closer to a liquidating valuation. . . . Thus, it is important to bear
in mind that the traditional standard is open to a broad range of
evidentiary possibilities."1 20
When discussing Delaware's change in appraisal forum, Justice
Quillen also showed his apparent dissatisfaction with past valuations.
In a statement particularly applicable to the new problem of valuing
nonrenewable natural resource companies, he observed that "if, in
the past, the process has been burdened by too strict an adherence to
precedent from different factual contexts than a case at hand, relief
has been supplied by a change of the initial forum."121 Thus, if a
corporation derives 75% of its intrinsic worth from nonrenewable
natural resources, Justice Quillen undoubtedly would weight asset
valuation at that figure. An asset valuation of only 50% would be
illogical.
The Kirby court did not value Kirby Lumber as a true natural
resource corporation.12 2 No other reported Delaware case exists
where a natural resource company was valued under the appraisal
statute. 123 Thus, a court could use Justice Quillen's reasoning to ap-
ply a heavier weight to the asset valuation of natural resource com-
panies without overturning significant precedent.
Although no post-Kirby court has appraised a nonrenewable nat-
ural resource company under the appraisal statute, the court in Lynch
v. Vickers Energy Corp. 124 valued stock of a natural resource company
119 413 A.2d at 150-51.
120 Id at 151.
121 Id
122 See notes 107-109 supra and accompanying text.
123 An unreported case dealing with the appraisal of a natural resource company exists,
but the situation there was unique. See In re Creole Petroleum Corp., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 606
(Del. Ch. 1978); see also note 72 supra.
124 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Oh. 1979).
[December 1982]
in a manner similar to the method used for appraisal proceedings. 25
In Lynch, minority shareholders attempted to block Vickers Energy
Corporation's planned merger with Trans-Ocean Oil Inc., a petro-
leum and natural gas company. The shareholders argued that the
stock value should be calculated solely on the basis of asset valua-
tion. 126 The court instead used the traditional method of appraisal
by weighting the asset, market, and investment valuations. In as-
signing a weight to the asset value, the court noted that the value of
the corporation's assets is an important element to be considered in
fixing the intrinsic value of stock, particularly of a wasting asset cor-
poration. 127 Nevertheless, the court adhered to the 50% ceiling on
asset valuations, and weighted that value at only 40%.128 Lynch was
not brought under the appraisal statute and thus could be distin-
guished from prior decisions. The holding suggests, however, that
courts would adhere to the 50% limitation even for nonrenewable
natural resource companies. Such a suggestion should not be fol-
lowed. When the facts warrant, courts should abandon the 50% ceil-
ing and use the flexibility of the traditional method to give a realistic
reflection of a corporation's true value.129
IV. Conclusion
The unique attributes of nonrenewable natural resource corpo-
rations should prompt a reevaluation of the Delaware courts' 50%
asset valuation ceiling. Both business and the judiciary have recog-
nized that such a corporation's intrinsic value substantially depends
on the value of its assets. The Delaware appraisal statute requires
125 The minority shareholders in Lynch asked for "damages arising as a consequence of an
alleged unfair offer of a parent corporation to buy the stock of its subsidiary's minority stock-
holders." Id at 11.
126 The minority shareholders contended that the merger terms were unfair because the
asset valuation was $17.50 and they had been offered only $12.00. Id
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Allowing the asset valuation to determine the bulk of a nonrenewable natural resource
company's fair value will undoubtedly make an appraisal more reflective-of intrinsic worth.
The importance of other factors, however, should be noticed as well. Few, if any, natural
resource companies rely exclusively on their raw materials. Investment and market value
considerations will normally comprise some portion of a corporation's intrinsic value. These
considerations can easily be made part of the appraisal, however, by weighting them as each
case merits. The investment and market values would have been totally ignored under the
shareholders' theory in Lynch, which advocated consideration of the company's asset value
only. Such an approach would result in replacing an over-emphasis on investment and mar-
ket values with an over-emphasis on asset value. The flexible approach retained by the Dela-
ware courts is preferable.
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that a dissenting minority shareholder be paid a fair price for his
stock. A more realistic price is also a more fair price. To arrive at a
more realistic price for nonrenewable natural resource corporations,
the courts must abandon their arbitrary 50% asset valuation ceiling.
By refusing to adhere to the 50% ceiling, the courts can fully
utilize the inherent flexibility of the traditional valuation method.
Such a refusal will allow future courts to fully reflect asset value not
only for nonrenewable natural resource companies, but for any com-
pany where assets comprise the majority of its intrinsic worth.
Mark G Weston
